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Gregory Pappas* 
What Difference Can “Experience” Make to Pragmatism?
Abstract: The centrality of “experience” for Pragmatism has been challenged. 
Neopragmatists insinuate that experienced-centered pragmatists (ECP) are 
conservative in hanging on to a passé philosophical notion. This paper argues that, on 
the contrary, ECP continue to insist on experience because of its present relevance and 
its future potential for philosophy, but this requires understanding what the classical 
igures were trying to accomplish with the notion of experience. In the irst section  
I remind readers what these functions are; the rest of the paper argues that experience 
continues to serve Pragmatism well, in particular in their view of inquiry. The notion 
of experience was what enabled Dewey to put forth a view of inquiry as guided by 
the qualitative that is still robust, defensible, and relevant, and that is not susceptible 
to the objections and dangers found in language centered Pragmatism (LCP). 
The main argument is an extension of a recent argument presented by Richard 
Bernstein in The Pragmatist Turn (2010). The second section of this essay presents 
Bernstein’s argument and shows how it can be signiicantly extended or reinforced 
by showing the difference experience, in particular its qualitative character, makes 
to a pragmatist view of inquiry. The third section addresses what Dewey means by 
the qualitative. The fourth section presents the speciic functions the qualitative has 
on thinking (inquiry). The qualitative accounts for the unity, continuity, coherence, 
direction, and self-regulation of inquiry. These are the important functions of what is 
noncognitive and nonlinguistic, precisely what LCP wishes to deny or not emphasize 
in giving up on experience. These functions are presently being corroborated by 
research in the science of cognition. The essay concludes in the ifth section with 
some implications of the arguments presented in the contemporary debate between 
LCP and ECP. If, as I argue, what is at stake in Pragmatism giving up experience 
is what gives its notion of inquiry its robust and promising character, then ECP is 
cutting-edge Pragmatism and LCP is more like “Paleopragmatism”.
The centrality of “experience” for Pragmatism has been challenged. Neopragmatists, 
starting with Richard Rorty and more recently Robert Brandom, have argued that 
Pragmatism could do well if it eliminated experience altogether. Brandom says, “Rorty 
and I both think that...the notion of experience is simply outmoded [...]. I agree with 
him that there is no useful way to rehabilitate the concept of experience. We just need 
to do without that”1. Instead, they insist that we need to move toward a language-
centered Pragmatism (LCP hereafter)2. LCP insinuate that experienced-centered 
* Texas A&M University [g-pappas@tamu.edu]
1. Brandom (2002: 5).
2. Rorty’s call to eliminate experience in Pragmatism has led to the development of a more language-
centered pragmatism, sometimes called “neopragmatism”. This language-centered strategy has become 
important in the work of igures such as Robert Brandom, Huw Price, Cheryl Misak, Michael Williams, 
and Bjørn Ramberg.
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pragmatists (ECP)3 are conservative in hanging on to a passé philosophical notion. 
This paper argues that, on the contrary, ECP continue to insist on experience because 
of its present relevance and functionality as well as its future potential for philosophy, 
but this requires understanding what the classical igures were trying to accomplish 
with the notion of experience. In the irst section I remind readers what these functions 
are; the rest of the paper argues that experience continues to serve Pragmatism well, in 
particular in their view of inquiry. 
I argue that the notion of experience was what enabled the Classical American 
pragmatists to put forth a view of inquiry that is still robust, defensible, and relevant, 
and that is not susceptible to the objections and dangers found in language centered 
Pragmatism (LCP). In The Pragmatic Turn (2010) Bernstein makes this same general 
argument, however, his defense of the importance of experience to the pragmatic 
conception of inquiry is limited to showing the difference that “secondness” (an aspect 
of experience presented by Charles S. Peirce) makes. Starting in the second section 
of this essay, I signiicantly extend or reinforce Bernstein’s argument by showing the 
difference that the qualitative aspect of experience makes to a pragmatists view of 
inquiry. This requires revisiting and reconstructing (in the third and fourth sections), 
John Dewey’s view of the nature and functions of the qualitative in all inquiries. For 
among the classical pragmatists he was the one that developed further the idea that all 
thinking is qualitative. 
For Dewey the qualitative accounts for how inquirers determine continuity, 
relevance, coherence, and reach judgments in inquiry. These are the important 
functions of what is noncognitive and nonlinguistic, precisely what LCP wishes to 
deny or not emphasize in giving up on experience. These views of Dewey are among 
the most signiicant consequences or fruits of his metaphilosophical commitment 
to experience. Moreover, they are presently being corroborated by research in the 
science of cognition. The essay concludes in the ifth section with some implications 
of the arguments presented to the contemporary debate between LCP and ECP. I argue 
that what is at stake in Pragmatism giving up experience is what gives its notion of 
inquiry its robust and promising character, therefore ECP is cutting-edge Pragmatism 
and LCP is more like “Paleopragmatism”.
 I. The Function of Experience in Pragmatism
The challenge presented by LCP to ECP has the merit of forcing all pragmatists 
not take for granted the philosophical legacy of the classical igures. However, 
the problem with the challenges that have been brought so far by LCP is they are 
remarkably weak, they have mostly miss their target, i.e. they have little to do with 
what classical pragmatist meant by “experience”. I will not review them here since 
3. In this paper ECP is understood as all those contemporary philosophers that have continued to adopt 
and reconstruct the notion of experience, especially as it appears in the works of William James and 
John Dewey. This experience-centered approach informs the work of a variety of recent contemporary 
pragmatists such as Thomas Alexander, Richard Shusterman, Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Gregory 
Pappas, Douglas Anderson, and many others. 
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enough has already been published on this issue4. Proper reevaluation of experience 
for Pragmatism needs to start by considering what the classical igures were trying to 
accomplish with the notion. 
The notion of experience served three broadly related functions in pragmatist 
philosophy: (1) the critical function of undermining the starting point shared by modern 
philosophy; (2) the preventative function of keeping pragmatists from inadvertently 
making some common mistakes in philosophy, such as “the philosophical fallacy”5 in 
all of its versions and manifestations including starting with dualisms, reductionism, 
neglect of context, and intellectualism (equating the real with what is known); 
and (3) the more edifying and reconstructive function of entailing some positive 
methodological prescriptions that resulted in a reconstruction of traditional notions of 
inquiry, self, morality, art, religion, and so on. 
Of all the classical pragmatists Dewey is the most explicit about these 
metaphilosophical functions of experience. It is unfortunate that in spite of his clarity 
about what experience means for Pragmatism LCP critics continue to confuse it with 
the epistemological notion of experience as a cognitive state or as sense perception. 
Dewey states, “Experience for philosophy is method, not distinctive subject-matter. 
And it also reveals the sort of method that philosophy needs” (LW 1: 371)6. Dewey is 
open to dropping the term “experience” or try something else if it is no longer needed 
and does not accomplish the above three functions. He says that if experience as 
method was “universally followed by philosophers, then the word and the notion of 
experience might be discarded” (LW 1: 372).
Throughout his philosophical career Dewey tried different ways to present what 
experience as method means. This is not the place to go into all the details about what 
experience as method entails for philosophy7; however, something must be said about 
why Dewey considered experience so important in light of the history of philosophy. 
This will give us a sense of how the three above functions are interrelated.
Pragmatism is a revolutionary philosophy in the history of philosophy because it 
criticizes the modern starting point and instead takes lived experience as the proper 
starting point of any philosophical investigation. According to the classical igures, 
underneath the debates among opposing schools in modern philosophy lies a common 
starting point that resulted in a certain view of experience, which in turn led to 
artiicial and irresolvable problems. The history of Pragmatism can be understood 
as the history of the criticism of a starting point that has been and continues to be 
favored in philosophy. With each new articulation of what this favored starting point 
comes to, there is the hope of sophistication in the detection and prevention of this 
ill in philosophy. Peirce called it “Cartesianism” because he saw it in Descartes8; 
4. See Hildebrand 2003, Ralston 2013, Bernstein 2010, Pappas and Hildebrand 2010, and Levine 2012.
5. For an explanations of all the different formulations of this fallacy see Pappas (2008: 17-42). 
6. Citations of the works of John Dewey in this article refer to the critical editions published by 
Southern Illinois University Press. In the citations the initials of the series are followed by volume and 
page numbers. Abbreviations for the critical edition are: EW The Early Works (1982-1898), MW The 
Middle Works (1899-1924), LW The Latter Works (1925-1952).
7. See Alexander (2013: 1-54); Pappas (2008: 17-42). 
8. In a Monist article published in 1905, Peirce made the following remarks: “Philosophers of very 
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James detected it in traditional empiricism and therefore called for a more “radical” 
empiricism. But once you get to Dewey, the failure to come to terms with the proper 
starting point was considered so common in philosophy that he decided to call it “the 
philosophical fallacy” (LW 1: 51). 
 The problem is that philosophers tend to favor starting with a theoretical view of 
things, in particular one in which we are subjects or spectators of a world to be known. 
Pragmatism instead proposes the radical idea that philosophy should start where we 
are, i.e., in the midst of our concrete pretheoretical, practical, everyday experience, 
and continue to return to that for conirmation. This is what experience as method 
amounts to. This method would not be so important to Dewey if most philosophizing 
had been done from this empirical postulate and attitude. For the most part, however, 
the temptation of philosophers have been to start with theoretical abstractions and 
explanations about their everyday lives instead of making an effort to attend to the 
richness and particularity of our practical everyday contexts as they are lived. 
If it was not for the fact that the word “practice” is commonly used to mean a 
certain narrow aspect of experience, practice, according to the classical pragmatist, 
is the adequate starting point because to be and start in experience is to be engaged 
in a practical, agentive way and not from a theoretical stance, as in the “Cartesian” 
contemplation of the objects of consciousness.
Experience as method accounts for the other themes associated with the classical 
pragmatists9. While important, the pragmatic maxim about the meaning of concepts 
is just one of many other consequences of taking lived experience as the starting 
point. It follows from their metaphilosophy that the meaning of concepts (including 
“truth”) must be cashed out in experiential terms and consequences. There are, of 
course, important differences between James, Dewey, and Peirce in regard to their 
particular views about meaning, truth, and much more. Nevertheless, they share a 
metaphilosophy, one that continues to be valorize and applied by contemporary ECP. 
I hope that this brief outline of the function of experience makes it clear what sort 
of argument LCP has to be able to produce in order to convince ECP to give up on 
experience. The burden of proof is on LCP to claim that some other notion, such as 
language, can better accomplish the above three functions or that the functions are no 
longer important. For ECP, experience continues to serve all of the above functions, 
notwithstanding the fact that the term is subject to misunderstandings. Experience 
allows Pragmatism to provide a full diagnosis of what has gone wrong with modern 
philosophy. Today it gives us a powerful basis for criticizing present debates, which 
diverse stripes propose that philosophy shall start from one or another state of mind in which no man, 
least of all the beginner in philosophy, actually is. One proposes that you shall begin by doubting 
everything, and says that there is only one thing that you cannot doubt, as if doubting were ‘as easy as 
lying’. Another proposes that we should begin by observing ‘the irst impressions of sense’ [...]. But in 
truth, there is but one state of mind from which you can ‘set out’, namely, the very state of mind in which 
you actually ind yourself at the time you do ‘set out’ – a state in which you are laden with an immense 
mass of cognition already formed, of which you cannot divest yourself if you would” (CP 5.416.).
9. Even their shared commitment to fallibilism and pluralism is a consequence of taking lived 
experience as their starting point. For one of the irst things that strikes us about experience is that it is 
experienced as changing, open-ended, plural, and subject to possible improvement. 
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are often family quarrels because of the same starting point. More importantly, it 
allows pragmatists today a way to criticize or improve the hypothesis or conclusions 
of the classical igures because they must be open to the possibility that some of the 
views of the classical igures may not it experience as we ind it today.
Of course, experience became more than a metaphilosophical commitment in 
that it resulted in a general view of experience, very different from the traditional 
notion, and one in which is experience is not reduced to a cognitive affair nor to a 
linguistic one, as LCP seem to entail – more on this later. This is a consequence of 
the edifying-reconstructive function previously mentioned (#3 above). The particular 
ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, and aesthetics of the classical pragmatists were 
consequences of taking experience seriously so that in reply to the question of what 
difference experience makes to Pragmatism one can point to these fruits.
A comprehensive reexamination of experience for Pragmatism in light of the 
above three functions is beyond what can be properly accomplished in a single 
paper. Experience as a notion has to be reevaluated in light of its consequences in 
all areas of philosophy. In this paper I focus on one of these fruits, the particular 
areas of philosophy that have to do with the study of human thought and knowledge: 
epistemology and logic10.
The broad thesis to be defended is that, in regard to its conception of inquiry, 
Pragmatism is better off if it continues to work with the notion of experience rather 
than eliminate it and go along with neopragmatists’ linguistic approach. By retaining 
experience we avoid certain problems endemic to an LCP approach and are able to 
continue to present an inclusive and rich conception of inquiry. The argument here is 
inspired by and can be seen as an extension of a recent argument by Richard Bernstein.
 
II. Extending Bernstein’s “Secondness” Argument
In The Pragmatic Turn, Bernstein argues that a pragmatic conception of 
inquiry requires experience. Language-centered accounts of inquiry presented 
by neopragmatists make Pragmatism vulnerable to certain obvious objections and 
dead ends. Bernstein writes, “One of the great dangers of the so called ‘linguistic 
turn’ is the way it keeps sliding into linguistic idealism, where there is nothing that 
constrains our language”11. He points out that one can detect an “anxiety” in the recent 
work of McDowell and Habermas because “there is nothing that really constrains 
or ties down our network of beliefs”12. Bernstein argues that these dificulties could 
have been avoided had LCP adopted the classical igures’ rich view of experience, 
but in particular what Charles S. Peirce called “secondness”. This is the idea that 
10. In spite of the narrow scope of my argument, it may well be the most effective in trying to convince 
philosophers of the importance of experience. Why? Because it shows the difference experience makes 
in epistemology. This is ironic since one of the main reasons that Dewey thought philosophers need 
experience was to do away with the unquestioned privilege of knowledge in modern philosophy. There 
is more to experience than knowledge. If I am right – that arguments about epistemology continue to be 
favored by philosophers – then this is further evidence that Pragmatism still needs experience.
11. Bernstein (2010: 134). 
12. Bernstein (2010: 134). 
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“experience involves bruteness, constraint, ‘over-and-againstness’. Experience is our 
great teacher. And experience takes place by a series of surprises”13. Without this 
element, Bernstein argues, experimental inquiries lack friction. 
Bernstein writes that “the insight that originally let philosophers to valorize 
experience – its brute compulsiveness – is what Peirce underscores with Secondness. 
Acknowledgement of this bruteness – the way in which experience ‘says NO!’ 
– is required to make sense of the self-corrective character of inquiry and 
experimentation”14. This is how Pragmatism can make sense of the self-corrective 
and experimental character of inquiry, and that there is more to rely on than our 
“conversational constraints”15. Secondness “does justice to what philosophers call 
their ‘realistic intuitions’”16. We do not need to reify a realm of facts that exists 
independently of any language, thought, or inquiry. Peirce does justice to the fallibility 
and openness of all inquiry “without losing touch with a reality that is independent of 
vagaries of me and you”17. Experience is what keeps Pragmatism from the danger of 
sliding into the language-communal relativism of Rorty. As Bernstein notes, “Peirce 
would have been repelled and horriied by Rorty’s claim that the only constraints 
upon us are conversational constrains. To speak in this manner is to ignore the 
facticity, the surprise, shock, and brute constraint of our experiential encounters”18. 
“Redescription”, Bernstein writes, “no matter how imaginative, is not enough”19. He 
concludes, “Contrary to the prevailing prejudice that the linguistic turn displaces old-
fashioned talk about experience Peirce’s conception of experience helps us to escape 
from some of the dead-ends of the linguistic turn”20.
Bernstein’s argument is right on target, but he is too kind in his criticism. He misses 
an opportunity to develop an even stronger argument on behalf of experience. He limits 
his defense to the importance of secondness in having a robust and defensible view of 
inquiry. He leaves out what Peirce calls “irstness” and Dewey calls the “qualitative” 
as a central aspect of experience. It was Dewey among the pragmatists who was more 
explicit and elaborated why the “qualitative” aspect of experience is so important to 
inquiry. If one extends Bernstein’s line of argumentation to include the importance of 
the qualitative, we have a much more stronger reason for why Pragmatism must not 
abandon experience. Without experience Pragmatism not only misses what constrains 
inquiry but much that guides and regulates it, in particular its qualitative dimension. 
According to Dewey and recent research on cognition, the qualitative accounts for the 
unity, continuity, coherence, direction, and self-regulation of inquiry.
In order to extend Bernstein’s argument and defend the importance of experience 
for Pragmatism I need to take several steps. The central task is to outline all the 
important functions that, for Dewey, the qualitative has in inquiry. These functions are 
13. Bernstein (2010: 134). 
14. Bernstein (2010: 134).
15. Bernstein (2010: 134).
16. Bernstein (2010: 134).
17. Bernstein (2010: 52). 
18. Bernstein (2010: 134). 
19. Bernstein (2010: 134). 
20. Bernstein (2010: 136). 
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varied and crucial to our best inquiries. But before addressing the different functions 
of the qualitative in Dewey’s view of inquiry, something must irst be said about what 
Dewey means by the qualitative21. In the next section I briely address some common 
misunderstandings about this notion, some responsible for the misdirected criticism 
of LCP to the classical pragmatists, that need to be cleared up before considering its 
several functions in inquiry. The sections that follow present the speciic functions 
that the qualitative has in thinking (inquiry). I formulate nine such functions. Dewey 
mentions these functions at different places in his later works, but never in the 
positive, explicit, and systematic ways that they are presented here. Dewey had a 
much more radical but timely qualitative-embodied logic than has been appreciated. 
No other ideas distinguish Dewey more from the orthodox or mainstream view of 
thinking in philosophy, while also receiving so much support from recent research on 
the science of cognition. No other ideas make it so clear how different is the starting 
point between LCP and ECP. The essay concludes in the fourth section with some 
implications of these ideas to the current LCP and ECP debate.
III. The Nature of the Qualitative
 Like the term “experience”, the term “qualitative” has baggage or traditional 
associations that frustrated Dewey’s effort to reconstruct philosophy. In philosophy 
quality is usually associated with either some abstract metaphysical property or some 
subjective or cognitive phenomena (as in sense data or qualia in consciousness), neither 
of which is Dewey’s view. These traditional but still common views about qualities in 
philosophy are the result of starting with a theoretical picture of experience, one that 
is dualistic, instead of beginning with “experience as it is experienced”22, hence the 
importance already mentioned of the metaphilosophical commitment of Pragmatism. 
For Dewey qualities are experienced, they require an experiencer, but they do not 
belong to consciousness. They are found in situations and reveal aspects of nature. 
Qualities are not subjective, nor are they objective in the sense of being antecedent to 
experience23.
Qualities are context dependent, i.e., they have their “home” and meaning in 
a particular situation and may change or vary depending on the organism and the 
environment. This is true of all qualities. Color and sound are not qualities appreciated 
21. The qualitative became Dewey’s way of making sense of the notion of a situation, a notion central 
not only to his views on logic but also his entire philosophy. Regarding situations, Dewey asserted that 
without it his “view cannot be understood” (LW 14: 33), and that “almost everything I have written is 
a commentary on the fact that situations are immediate in their direct occurrence, and mediating and 
mediated in the temporal continuum constituting life-experience” (LW 14: 30). 
22. This is Dewey’s “postulate of immediate empiricism” (MW 3: 158-68). In Dewey’s empirical 
starting point there is no dualism; the distinction between experiencing and what is experienced are two 
aspects of the integrity of lived experience. 
23. The only sense in which Dewey says a quality is “intrinsic” or “objective” is in the sense that 
qualities are experienced as belonging to a thing as a “brute matter of space-time existence” (LW 15: 43). 
In this sense, he states, “all qualities whatever are ‘intrinsic’ to the things they qualify at the time and 
place of the occurrence of the latter – provided only the things in question do genuinely ‘have’ them” 
(LW 15: 43). 
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or discriminated in isolation, or self-suficient elements that can be used to explain 
complex cases of sense perception. What is always experienced is the context of a 
situation as a scene of action, where what we are directly concerned with becomes 
focal and meaningful because of that implicit ield. “When objects or qualities 
are cognitively apprehended, they are viewed in reference to the exigencies of the 
perceived ield in which they occur” (LW 12: 153). However, the context in which 
particular qualities occur is itself qualitative since for Dewey there are tertiary 
qualities, i.e., qualities that pervade all the parts of a whole. This is key to Dewey’s 
notion of a situation because the quality that pervades a situation is what demarcates 
it as a situation. A situation is a “complex existence that is held together in spite of 
its internal complexity by the fact that it is dominated and characterized throughout 
by a single quality” (LW 5: 246). To say that this quality “pervades” is to say that the 
quality runs through every aspect and detail of a situation, and that it gives meaning 
to each and binds them together. “If the situation experienced is that of being lost in 
a forest, the quality of being lost permeates and affects every detail that is observed 
and thought of” (LW 12: 203). In the following section we see how important these 
tertiary qualities are to a well-functioning inquiry. 
The modern notion of experience reduces experience to experiencing, as a 
subjective cognitive state. This mistake, as well as the mind-body dualism and faculty 
psychology, has been responsible for the denigration or under appreciation of the 
function of what is qualitative (understood as emotions, feelings, passions) in thinking 
or cognition. The challenge we inherit from Dewey is how to talk about the qualitative 
without reifying the old dualisms between reason and passion, or between thinking and 
feeling. It is not easy to continue to use such terms and avoid dualistic connotations. 
Even if many philosophers have abandoned the above dualisms in philosophy, they 
have continued to entertain intellectualist conceptions of thinking and intelligence. 
These are views that ignore the noncognitive qualitative context in which thinking 
occurs. Instead, they emphasize objects of knowledge, cognitive states, beliefs, 
propositions, reasoning, justiication, and explanation. Insofar as LCP has continued 
this emphasis (and neglect), they belong to this same intellectualist tradition. 
In the sciences there have been similar views under the name of “cognitivism” in 
which thinking is described in terms of “information procession models”24. However, 
this view has recently been challenged by what is called “embodied cognition”25. 
Empirical research on embodied cognition has exploded over the past thirteen years. 
These theories support Dewey’s claims about the qualitative and thinking. Like 
Dewey, they do not start with the dualism mentioned but with a naturalistic starting 
point where as Mark Johnson explains, “body and mind are just different aspects of 
an ongoing interactional process of experience. Thus, the nature of our human bodies 
determines both what we can experience and think and also how we think, that is, how 
we conceptualize and reason”26. Embodied cognition theorists accept a radical view 
of embodied logic and meaning that emphasizes the role of emotions. According to 
24. See Güzeldere 1998. 
25. See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/embodied-cognition/.
26. Johnson (2006: 46-54). 
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Johnson, the work of cognitive neuroscientist Antonio Damasio has “opened the door 
to a serious reconsideration of James’s claim [adopted by Dewey] that what we call 
logic requires an intact and functioning emotional system, and that our bodies play a 
crucial role in what makes sense to us and how we reason about it”27. 
What Dewey means by the qualitative includes and points to the dimension of our 
everyday experience that we call “emotions” or “feelings”, but he is concerned that 
we do not ontologize or hypostatize emotions and feelings as entities independent of 
or antecedent to our direct qualitative experiences. This is why he says, “Experience 
is emotional but there are no separate things called emotions in it” (LW 10: 48). What 
we call emotions are things that we relectively discriminate after we have certain 
immediate qualitative experiences. We identify anger as an emotion but “when angry 
we are not aware of anger but of these objects in their immediate and unique qualities” 
(LW 5: 248)28.
Perhaps the more dificult thing to understand about the qualitative is that it 
is experiences “had” and not cognitive or linguistic. In “Postulate of Immediate 
Empiricism” (1905), Dewey is already aware of how common and tempting it has 
been for philosophers to reduce, for example, the immediate experience of being 
frightened by a noise to “I knew I was frightened” or to some propositional description. 
An empirical philosopher must not concede this seemingly simple point to the critic. 
Theories of knowledge have tended to reduce immediate qualitative experience to 
something cognitive or linguistic, usually to a type of belief or perception, but this 
is not how they “are experienced as”29. The reduction of immediate experience to 
perception, as a form of cognition usually contrasted with conception, is assumed 
by LCP in much of the recent misdirected criticism of Dewey as succumbing to the 
“myth of the given”, the notion that there is some nonconceptual epistemological 
foundation30.
27. Johnson (2006: 46). See also Johnson 2010, and Damasio 2003. While this new research is exciting 
and important to those of us that agree with Dewey about the qualitative, we must not confuse or 
conlate a scientiic theoretical explanation of how, as biological organisms, our emotions play a role in 
thought (which may include an evolutionary account of cognition and how our brains developed) with 
ontological claims about the qualitative (e.g., that primary experience is qualitative and felt). 
28. Dewey issues the same warning about identifying the qualitative too closely with having a 
“feeling”, even though it is about what is “felt”: “If we designate this permeating qualitative unity 
in psychological language, we say it is felt rather than thought. Then, if we hypostatize it, we call 
it a feeling. But to term it a feeling is to reverse the actual state of affairs. Qualitativeness in the 
subject-matter deines the meaning of ‘feeling’. The notion that ‘a feeling’ designates a ready-made 
independent psychical entity is a product of a relection which presupposes the direct presence of 
quality as such” (LW 5: 248). 
29. According to the postulate of immediate empiricism, “things are what they are experienced as” 
(MW 3: 158). As early as 1916 Dewey notes how phenomenologically insensitive philosophers tend to 
focus on a distinction obvious in experience: “The distinction between the two types of experience is 
evident to anyone who will take the trouble to recall what he does most of the time when not engaged 
in meditation or inquiry. But since one does not think about knowledge except when he is thinking, 
except, that is, when the intellectual or cognitional interest is dominant, the professional philosopher 
is only too prone to think of all experiences as if they were of the type he is specially engaged in, and 
hence unconsciously or intentionally to project its traits into experiences to which they are alien” 
(MW 10: 321).
30. Robert Brandom states, “Rorty and I both think that Sellars’ critique of the myth of the given shows 
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To be sure, Dewey does not assume a dualism between experienced had and the 
cognized. The latter, though different, is continuous with the former31. “Later one may 
(or may not) have an experience describable as I know-I-am...frightened. But this is 
a different experience”(MW 3: 162), one that is a result of inquiry. Some experiences 
“had” may end up having an important cognitive function in inquiry because, as we 
will see, they are funded by previous inquiries or lead to knowledge, but that does not 
change their ontological status of being, when they are experienced, as noncognitive. 
Dewey explains the mistake made by philosophers: “When, in a subsequent relective 
experience, we look back and ind these things and qualities...we are only too prone to 
suppose that they were then what they are now – objects of a cognitive regard, themes 
of an intellectual gesture. Hence, the erroneous conclusion that things are either just 
out of experience, or else are (more or less badly) known objects” (MW 3: 162) .
More could be done on clarifying the ontological status of the qualitative32, but 
the above should be suficient to avoid some common misunderstandings and serve 
as a background to the task ahead: outlining the functions that Dewey thought the 
qualitative have in inquiry and its implications.
 
IV. The Functions of the Qualitative in Dewey’s View of Inquiry
Dewey philosophical insights about the important functions of the qualitative in 
inquiry are scattered in his works, though most of them appear in Qualitative Thought 
(QT). One dificulty in sorting them out as I do here is that Dewey mainly writes about 
what happens if the qualitative is defective or fails to guide, instead of specifying 
the positive functions of the qualitative. This strategy makes sense, given that he is 
trying to make us aware of something about our experience of thinking that is so taken 
for granted. The consequences of lack of control of the operations of inquiry (e.g., 
observation, reasoning) by the qualitative are confusion, incoherence, arbitrariness, 
the mechanical, lack of logical force, and leaving relations unexplained. However, 
making explicit the positive functions of the qualitative seems a worthwhile task. 
First, it makes more evident the centrality of Dewey’s view on the qualitative in 
his views on inquiry, and in particular his logic. Second, and relevant to the main 
argument in this paper, it makes clear what is at stake for Pragmatism if it gives up on 
experience: a robust view of inquiry. 
the notion of experience as simply outmoded...I agree with him that there is no useful way to rehabilitate 
the concept of experience. We just need to do without that” (interview with Robert Brandom, Filosoisk 
Supplement, 5). Scott Aikin claims that Dewey relied on noninferential and nonconceptual content or 
givens as perceptual inputs for cognitive experience (2009: 19-27). According to Koopman, “To avoid 
this foundationalism...contemporary pragmatists who are eager to revive the concept of experience 
must be on guard to not treat experience as a kind of ultimate given-ness against which we might be 
able to measure our truth claims” (2007: 696-97).
31. Moreover, as we will soon explain, the cognized is within a qualitative situation “had” as its context 
or background. 
32. In Experience and Nature Dewey translates the difference between had and cognitive experiences 
in terms of two basic traits that can be attributed to nature: nature in its inalities (or consummations) 
and in its relations (LW 1: 82). 
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At the end of QT Dewey summarizes his main thesis very well: “The immediate 
existence of quality, and of dominant and pervasive quality, is [a] the background, 
[b] the point of departure, and [c] the regulative principle of all thinking” (LW 5: 261)33. 
In truth, each of these broad functions [a, b, c] received a much detailed speciication 
in the later works of Dewey. Lets unpack all the functions. 
 
[a] “the background”
 i. The qualitative as the background that uniies and demarcates the situation 
in which thinking occurs
The notion that the qualitative functions as the background of thinking has already 
been addressed or implied in the idea that knowledge is just one mode of experience 
located within experience at large, and in the distinction between experiences had 
and cognized. Dewey states that “the background, the thread, and the directive clue 
in what we do expressively think of...is ‘felt’ rather than thought” (LW 5: 248). The 
qualitative is what characterizes our pretheoretical and precognitive experience in 
the world. A qualitative world of persons and things is the most basic and inclusive 
context in which one inds language, knowledge, and all of our more discursive 
activities, including philosophy. “The universe of experience surrounds and regulates 
the universe of discourse but never appears as such within the latter” (LW  12: 74). 
However, there is no qualitative experience at large that makes the background of 
discourse-thinking; there is always a speciic situation. Thinking arises from within 
and emerges out of the pervasive qualitative situations that make up the moments of 
our lives. All thought is situated, embodied, and interfused with feeling. 
In his philosophical career Dewey struggled to make sense to others of his important 
notion of a “situation”34. A particular situation is demarcated by an experienced 
unifying quality, and each situation is unique. You can describe and have a theory 
about situations, but these forms of discourse point to something that is experienced. 
This sounded (and still sounds) mysterious or contradictory to philosophers who 
assume the ubiquity of knowledge or language (discourse) in life. 
Dewey’s frustration with Russell on this issue is obvious in these passages: 
M. Russell has not been able to follow the distinction I make between the immediately 
had material of non-cognitively experienced situations and the material of cognition –  
a distinction without which my view cannot be understood. (LW 14: 33)
33. I have added the [ ] in the above quotation because there are actually three different claims made 
here about the qualitative. Dewey does not separate them, nor has Dewey scholarship considered them 
separately as I do. 
34. Dewey did not abandon the importance of the correlated notions of situations and the qualitative to 
his philosophy even after the publication of QT. In the recently published Unmodern Philosophy that 
Dewey wrote in 1945, Dewey stresses in the last chapter how “everything inquired into and discussed 
belongs in a ield or situation” (2012: 334), and how “qualities...characterize the matter of irst hand 
experience”(2012: 334). In fact, Dewey repeats almost the same central thesis of QT: “Every case of 
knowing begins and ends with and in situations and is regulated all the way through in its capacity as a 
transition from one situation to another” (2012: 342; emphasis mine). I will later show why for Dewey 
regulation of thinking by a situation is synonymous with regulation of thinking by the qualitative. 
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Any one who refuses to go outside the universe of discourse – as Mr. Russell apparently 
does – has of course shut himself off from understanding what a “situation”, as directly 
experienced subject-matter, is. (LW 14: 31)35
Dewey understands the force of the objection that we must use language to refer 
to what is presumably nonlinguistic: “It would be a contradiction if I attempted to 
demonstrate by means of discourse, the existence of universes of experience”. But 
he offers this reply, which clariies his view: “It is not a contradiction by means of 
discourse to invite the reader to have for himself that kind of immediately experienced 
situation in which the presence of a situation as a universe of experience is seen to be 
the encompassing and regulating condition of all discourse” (LW 12: 75).
For Dewey, a situation is in the background as context and always remains there. 
One cannot “decline to have a situation for that is equivalent to having no experience” 
(LW 12: 74). To some extent, the experience of a unifying quality of a situation deies 
description, for as soon as we describe it we are making discriminations regarding 
a situation that was once felt while we are in a new situation that cannot be stated 
and made explicit. In other words, quality is ineffable in that it cannot be objectively 
denoted in such a way that it is not embedded in another experience (a situation) with 
its own quality. 
This claim about ineffability is bound to make LCP and all twentieth-century 
philosophers who are committed to the linguistic turn in philosophy suspicious that 
Dewey is committed to some mysterious metaphysical domain. It is one reason why a 
neopragmatist like Robert Brandom thinks it would be best for Pragmatism to abandon 
the notion of experience since thinking is only embedded in “linguistic practices”36. 
However, Dewey was puzzled as to why philosophers believed his claims about 
the ineffable aspect of experience commit someone to any mysterious domain. He 
says, “The word ‘experience’ is, I repeat, a notation of an inexpressible as that which 
decides the ultimate status of all which is expressed; inexpressible not because it is so 
remote and transcendent, but because it is so immediately engrossing and matter of 
course” (MW 10: 325). 
According to Mark Johnson, “One of the most earth-shattering discoveries to 
come out of the cognitive sciences over the past three decades is that human thinking 
and willing operate mostly beneath the level of our conscious awareness”37. This is 
unsettling for philosophers today, but it was key to the view of experience of William 
James and Dewey. The received Enlightenment view of thinking as a conscious 
reasoning process is for Dewey only one aspect of what occurs at the foreground of 
thinking. When we think at the foreground, we discriminate objects, patterns, and 
relations, but beneath such fruits of relection there is a felt experience of a pervasive 
unifying quality of the entire situation that one is inhabiting. This unity is precisely 
35. M. Russell is so wedded to the idea that there is no experienced material outside the ield of 
discourse that any intimation that there is such material relegates it, ipso facto, to the status of the 
“unknowable” (LW 14: 33). 
36. Brandom (2011: 26). 
37. Johnson (2014: 114). 
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the situation that one is in. Critical to this view is the existence of the tertiary qualities 
already mentioned, i.e., qualities that pervade entire contexts38. 
This general idea that there is a larger unity or context that uniies and makes 
meaningful the parts so that without it the parts are not a unity nor meaningful is not 
new. Twentieth-century philosophy of language and epistemology has moved beyond 
the atomistic view that meaning and truth are properties of a single word and belief 
to the more holistic view that particular words and beliefs can only be meaningful 
because of the broader context of a language, a “web of beliefs” or “conceptual 
schemes”. What is radical about Dewey is that all of these larger contexts are uniied 
and meaningful because of what is not discourse and is very particular: a unique and 
qualitative situation. Dewey writes, “Discourse that is not controlled by reference to a 
situation is not discourse, but a meaningless jumble, just as a mass of pied type is not 
a font much less a sentence” (LW 12: 74).
ii. The qualitative as the background that gives continuity to thinking
Since inquiry is a process, the unity provided by the qualitative as background is 
also temporal, that is, it provides a needed continuity without which inquiry could 
easily be diverted. The qualitative therefore functions as the underlying “thread” and 
“directive clue” (LW 5: 248) of what is explicitly thought about. Inquiry begins with a 
situation that has the tertiary quality of being indeterminate, but is soon experienced as 
“problematic”, that is, as relecting on answering the question “what is the problem?”. 
At this point, Dewey says, “to mistake the problem involved is to cause subsequent 
inquiry to be irrelevant or go astray” (LW 12: 112). For Dewey, it is the qualitative that 
guides the inquirer in knowing whether he/she is still dealing with the same problem 
or is venturing into a different one. Dewey explains how “feeling” the problem is 
what protects us from “leaps” or diversions in the process of inquiry. Attention to 
the continuous but changing feeling is what “enables us to keep thinking about one 
problem without our having constantly to stop to ask ourselves what it is after all 
that we are thinking about. We are aware of it not by itself but as the background, the 
thread, and the directive clue in what we do expressly think of. For the latter things 
are its distinctions and relations” (LW 5: 248).
The background functions of the qualitative in thinking that we have outlined 
are the least radical claim in the above summary thesis of Dewey in QT. Even the 
most intellectualist of philosophers can easily acknowledge that there is a background 
38. Dewey does not have an argument to show that there are such qualities. All he does, and perhaps 
all he can do, is appeal to the reader’s experience. In QT he uses examples in the experiences of 
the arts. The experience of pervasive quality is how we immediately identify or distinguish, for 
example, a Picasso from a Matisse. “A man sees a picture and says at irst sight that it is by Goya or 
by someone inluenced by him. He passes the judgment long before he has made any analysis or any 
explicit identiication of elements. It is the quality of the picture as a whole that operates”(LW 5: 251). 
Similarly, beneath or encompassing the rich variety of things found in a thinking event in which we 
partake, there is a single quality that pervades the entire experience. When we are engaged in thinking 
about a particular scientiic problem or any ordinary problem, there is an all-encompassing way that it 
feels and “colors” all the things we recognize or discriminate that is unique to that moment in your life 
and that demarcates it from other events. Dewey warns that “this unity is neither emotional, practical, 
nor intellectual, for these terms name the distinctions that relection can make within it” (LW 10: 44). 
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surrounding discourse that is nondiscursive and nonlinguistic. The more controversial 
claims in Dewey’s thesis are the next two clauses: that the qualitative is also “the point 
of departure”, and that it is “regulative”. 
 [b]“The point of departure”
iii. The qualitative motivates, gives the initial sense of direction to and 
material for inquiry, and is a condition for the emergence of genuine thinking
While this statement mentions four different functions of the qualitative, I address 
them together since they all address inquiry at its inception or point of departure. 
The less controversial of these functions is that the qualitative is the starting point 
in the sense that it motivates (“sparks” or “triggers”) inquiry. In fact, this has been 
one the most common traditional views about the function of the qualitative, usually 
understood as our passional-affective nature: it is what drives the intellect (or reason), 
but once inquiry is on its way the qualitative plays no cognitive function. But this is 
hardly Dewey’s view. 
While all thinking is embedded in a qualitative context, only a qualitative context 
of a particular mode, indeterminate, makes thinking emerge from the stream of 
life. Situations that demand reconstruction through inquiry are situations that are 
qualitatively experienced as unsettled, confused, and indeterminate. The transformation 
of the pervasive quality of this sort of situation is, in effect, the general function of 
inquiry. The indeterminate situation is at irst precognitive – “A problem must be felt 
before it can be stated” (LW 12: 76) – but it is soon experienced as “problematic”, that 
is, as relecting on answering the question “what is the problem?”39.
Experiencing the situation as problematic or requiring inquiry is the initial step in 
inquiry but it arises from a precognitive indeterminate situation that is not a subjective 
or mental state or a confused cognitive state40; Moreover, Dewey stresses that its 
qualitative indeterminacy is unique and cannot be ignored or passed over by an inquirer 
since however unstable or confusing the situation may feel, it is through it and by it that 
we receive any empirical guidance as to where to go next in inquiry. In other words, 
even when the qualitative is functioning as a point of departure, it is a departure that 
already provides a much-needed point or sense of direction as to where to go – it is 
already exercising a “regulative” function. Dewey says, “It is this unique quality...that 
exercises control over its special procedures...Unless a situation is uniquely qualiied 
in its very indeterminateness, there is a condition of complete panic; response to it 
takes the form of blind and wild overt activities” (LW 12: 109). Scientiic inquirers, 
no matter how theoretical or abstract their problems may be, begin with and take 
seriously their qualitative starting point, i.e., the unique indeterminacy that is felt. 
39. One phase merges into the other but must not be confused. “The unsettled or indeterminate situation 
might have been called a problematic situation. This name would have been, however, proleptic and 
anticipatory. The indeterminate situation becomes problematic in the very process of being subjected 
to inquiry. There is nothing intellectual or cognitive in the existence of such situations, although they 
are the necessary condition of cognitive operations or inquiry” (LW 12: 111). 
40. He stresses that “it is the situation that has these traits, We are doubtful because the situation is 
inherently doubtful” (LW 12: 109). 
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If there is not enough of a problem grounded in these qualitative experiences inquiry 
lacks more than a spark, it lacks a sense of where to go. 
About the indeterminacy experienced at the start of or preceding inquiry, Dewey 
says in QT: “In itself, it is the big, buzzing, blooming confusion of which James 
wrote. This expresses not only the state of a baby’s experience but the irst stage 
and background of all thinking on any subject. There is, however, no inarticulate 
quality which is merely buzzing and blooming. It buzzes to some effect; it blooms 
toward some fruitage. That is, the quality, although dumb, has as a part of its complex 
quality a movement or transition in some direction. It can, therefore, be intellectually 
symbolized and converted into an object of thought” (LW 5: 254; emphasis mine). 
The notion that a noncognitive and immediate quality can become or be the seed 
of intellectually symbolized subject matter or objects of thought may seem strange 
to someone with different metaphysical assumptions or may seem like Dewey is 
presupposing a dualism, but the view is that there is continuity between two kinds 
of experiences. He states, “when it is said that a thing cognized is different from 
an earlier non-cognitionally experienced thing, the saying no more implies lack of 
continuity between the things, than the obvious remark that a seed is different than a 
lower” (MW 3: 166). Our more relective judgments (the lower) emerge from within 
the same initial qualitative experience (the seed) that provoked it. Moreover, what 
occurs is not a total displacement of one kind over the other, i.e., from the qualitative 
to the purely symbolic or cognitive. Even the most symbolic, cognitive propositional 
is contained within a qualitative context, a context that participates (contributes) to the 
development of the process even if it is not in the foreground or even addressed in our 
explicit justiications and explanations. 
 [c] “The regulative principle of all thinking”
 One could agree that the qualitative (as a felt situation) is in the background 
and the starting point of all thinking, but also claim that once discourse is on its 
way its development or regulation is independent of the felt dimension of experience. 
This is not Dewey’s view. As soon as relection gets started in any of the events in 
which we think, we make discriminations and engage in the operations of inquiry, but 
even when it is in the background, as it is in the sciences, the qualitative operates by 
regulating, controlling the process of inquiry. 
The following are speciic ways mentioned throughout several of Dewey’s later 
works in which the qualitative exerts a regulative function in inquiry.
iv. The qualitative as “intuition” that precedes relection and functions as 
funded experience
 In inquiry, relective activities such as reasoning, discrimination, analysis, 
inferences, reason examination, and justiication are preceded by a qualitative 
assessment that can be called “intuition”. Dewey claims that relection is often 
“ideational and conceptual transformation of what begins as an intuition” (LW 5: 249). 
Dewey is well aware of the problem with the word “intuition”. He does not mean a 
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faculty or a type of knowledge; it is simply an immediate qualitative judgment that is 
functionally different from those later in the same inquiry that are considered more 
relective or preceded by relection. 
Relection and rational elaboration spring from and make explicit a prior intuition. 
But there is nothing mystical about this fact, and it does not signify that there are two 
modes of knowledge, one of which is appropriate to one kind of subject-matter, and the 
other mode to the other kind...Intuition, in short, signiies the realization of a pervasive 
quality such that it regulates the determination of relevant distinctions. (LW 5: 249)
When we are in a problematic situation we start with immediate unrelective 
qualitative judgments that precede the more deinite recognition of which particular 
features of the situation conirm or go against our judgment. We engage in analysis, 
survey, and reasoning in order to examine (test) or revise this preliminary reaction. The 
overwhelming irst impression comes irst; it changes as inquiry proceeds, and it serves 
to guide the subsequent phases of analysis and discrimination. Dewey explains how all 
inquiry starts with a “hunch” or “impression”, but this is not something psychical or 
psychological. It is the presence of a dominant quality in a situation as a whole. 
To say I have a feeling or impression that so and so is the case is to note that the 
quality in question is not yet resolved into determinate terms and relations; it marks a 
conclusion without statement of the reasons for it, the grounds upon which it rests. It is 
the irst stage in the development of explicit distinctions. All thought in every subject 
begins with just such an unanalyzed whole. (LW 5: 248-249)
The view that intuition precedes reasoning (reason giving and justiication) has 
received considerable support in recent research in social psychology and cognitive 
science. Psychologists Hauser and Haidt have presented a model of moral cognition in 
which judgments are primarily intuitive, “gut-level”, emotionally guided evaluations 
that occur prior to explicit reasoning or deliberation41. “Intuition...is the main cause 
of moral judgment...and then reasoning typically follows that judgment...to construct 
post hoc justiications”42. 
For Dewey the model of thinking suggested by this recent research is true of all 
thinking, not just moral cognition. This reversal of the traditional function of reasoning 
may seem like Hume’s view that the intellect is at the mercy of the passions, but 
some qualiications are necessary to avoid confusing it with the Humean view or with 
what we usually call “rationalizations”. First, for Dewey there is no dualism between 
intuition and our more relective judgments. On the contrary, there is continuity and 
in proper inquiry one ensues on the other. Second, while the qualitative as intuition 
starts and guides explicit reasoning or articulated propositional thought, it is itself 
transformed in the process by relection. Third, even though our irst intuitions are 
immediate, qualitative, and noncognitive, they are funded by previous experience. 
41. Hauser 2006. See also Hauser, Young, and Cushman (2008: 107-143). 
42. Haidt (2012: 46). See also Haidt (2001: 814-34); Green and Haidt (2002: 517-23); Haidt (2007: 
998-1002); Haidt and Joseph (2004: 55-66); and Haidt 2006. 
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This is why they are such an important resource to inquiry. Dewey claims that 
sometimes our immediate experiences of pervasive quality have “intellectual import” 
because they are not mere immediate responses; they are well funded, i.e., they “sum 
up and integrate prolonged previous experience and training, and bring to a uniied 
head the results of severe and consecutive relection” (LW 5: 250). 
Sometimes our intuitions are so well funded by previous experience and relection 
that they are the source of brilliant thinking. However, as we know, intuitions can 
at other times be funded with malignant prejudices or narrow perspectives. There 
is no way to ind out a priori which ones are which. Nevertheless, experimental 
thinking needs to start where we are or with what we have. Different individuals 
and communities start with different intuitions. Hopefully, inquiry and criticism will 
reveal whether they are to be questioned or transformed, but there is no Archimedean 
standpoint where intuitions can be examined, nor is there a relective standpoint that 
is not itself guided by an immediate qualitative of a situation. 
For Dewey the view that judgments and evaluations are reached by reasoning 
(with premises and rules in propositional form) is a theoretical-abstract explanation 
that we can devise after we make actual judgments and decisions. They are not how 
the most competent inquirers experience these situations. This is the case in all areas 
of our lives where judgment is required. Good scientists, trumpet players, and cooks 
may formulate the basis of their judgments in a set of rules or criteria, but this is done 
for the purposes of the novice; it does not come into their experience43. 
For Dewey the demand for reasons and justiication is not a function of reason but 
something that emerged socially. “It is quite conceivable that if no one had ever had 
to account to others for his decisions, logical operations would never have developed, 
but men would use exclusively methods of inarticulate intuition and impression, 
feeling; so that only after considerable experience in accounting for their decisions 
to others who demanded a reason...did men begin to give an account to themselves 
of the process of reaching a conclusion in a justiied way”(MW 15: 73). Articulating 
in propositional form what traits or features of a situation sustain one’s judgment is 
key to justifying ourselves to others, and to invite them to consider the situation for 
themselves. In other words, it facilitates a more communal inquiry and it may lead to 
a change in the overall qualitative judgment of what is correct as inquiry proceeds.
Our intuitions are usually the result of what habits have been developed from 
previous experience. However, Dewey does not limit the function of the qualitative 
to bringing to bear past funded experience on present experience. This is important 
to distinguish his view from other contemporary views. Some twentieth-century 
philosophers have given the qualitative (as either “gut feelings”, “emotional reactions 
of ‘yuk’”44, or “intuitions”) some guiding role in deliberation, but it clearly plays 
a subordinate role in more ways than one. For example, when gut feelings are 
determined to have some weight it is because they are conceived as or reduced to 
43. See “Logical Method and Law” (MW 15: 65), Dewey distinguishes “vital logic” from the “logic 
of exposition”.
44. See http://philosophybites.com/2009/03/julian-savulescu-on-the-yuk-factor.html
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habits or some useful form of intuitive social knowledge45. They are given some 
function in deliberation because they are conceived as, at best, disguised (embodied) 
crude rules of thumb that have served us in the past. Nevertheless, they are useful only 
at the beginning of inquiry and are inept in dealing with the complexity and nuances 
of particular situations. We have to rely on them because, unfortunately, we don’t 
have time for relection in many situations. For example, it is a good thing that most 
of us have an immediate “feeling” regarding incoherence, danger, and injustices, but 
nothing replaces deliberation by reason. In an ideal world, a world without limitations 
on time to make well-reasoned decisions, we would not need to rely on the qualitative. 
This is not Dewey’s view. 
Dewey agrees that because immediate experience is funded we have good reason 
to trust the gut feelings of the experienced few on some subjects; however, for him 
the function of the qualitative is not limited to lessons from the past, it is also what 
guides the present operations of inquiry in light of the present situation that is being 
transformed as it is transformed. To put it crudely, we “feel” the present situation as 
we think so that, contrary to the above view, we often need the qualitative to assess 
the complexity, uniqueness, and nuances of particular situations. The particular details 
of a situation or what operations are relevant are determined by being sensitive to 
the present context of inquiry. In other words, guiding ourselves by the qualitative 
in a situation amounts to more that just guiding ourselves by our habits. A skilled 
scientist or jazz musician certainly responds automatically (habitually to certain cues 
in experience). There is a know-how that is the result of previous experience, but there 
is also a response to the unique qualitative guidance of the situation as it develops. The 
present situation sometimes guides in ways that are not reduced to previously found 
know-how. The richness of present qualitative experiences and its instructions for us 
are not always reduced to the conditions of what we bring from past experiences.
v. The qualitative determines the relevance and weight of distinctions, facts, 
concepts, and principles in inquiry
In inquiry the search for the reasons that ground our overall impression or intuition 
must be a sincere survey of how the relevant features that make up a situation are 
related, and it may lead to assertions or propositions to be tested. However, how do 
we determine what features are relevant in a particular inquiry and how much weight 
should they be given relative to others? The answer is by being sensitive to the quality 
of the situation. 
The qualitative has the important function of guiding inquirers in their immediate 
sense of what is relevant and irrelevant as inquiry proceeds. In QT Dewey says, “The 
underlying unity of qualitativeness regulates pertinence or relevancy and force of 
every distinction and relation” (LW 5: 249); and, in the Logic, “without its controlling 
presence, there is no way to determine the relevancy, weight or coherence of any 
45. This is the view of our immediate emotional intuitions that is assumed by, for example, 
Hare 1981. This view is also explained in “Julian Savulescu on the ‘Yuk’ Factor” available at:  http://
philosophybites.com/2009/03/julian-savulescu-on-the-yuk-factor.html. 
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designated distinction or relation” (LW 12: 74). In Art as Experience he claims that 
emotion is not just the moving force of inquiry but the “cementing” that “selects what 
is congruous and dyes what is selected with its color, thereby giving qualitative unity 
to materials disparate and dissimilar” (LW 10: 44).
Sensitivity to the quality of a situation is crucial in determining the relevance 
of our rules and principles in any inquiry. “The situation controls the terms of 
thought; for they are its distinctions, and applicability to it is the ultimate test of their 
validity” (LW 5: 247). No matter how good or true our propositions or principles are, 
“there is no label, on any given idea or principle, that says automatically “use me 
in this situation” (LW 8: 215). The direct tact and discernment of a good judge in 
any type of inquiry is not a matter of being equipped with information. No rules can 
replace the power to seize the signiicant factors in a situation and the sensitivity to the 
quality of the problematic situation that is being transformed. 
vi. The qualitative provides guidance in selection and rejection 
Determining relevance and weight in inquiry is usually a means of deciding 
what to select and reject as inquiry develops, therefore the qualitative is also key to 
these operations. Dewey says that the qualitative “guides selection and rejection and 
the manner of utilization of all explicit terms” (LW 5: 249), and that “the selective 
determination and relation of objects in thought is controlled by reference to a situation 
– to that which is constituted by a pervasive and internally integrating quality, so that 
failure to acknowledge the situation leaves, in the end, the logical force of objects and 
their relations inexplicable” (LW 5: 246). The consequences of not regulating inquiry 
by the qualitative can be what we usually call scattered thinking and incoherence. In 
some forms of inquiry the qualitative accounts for the “intellectual deinitiveness” and 
“coherence” of the objects of a thought46.
vii. The qualitative guides the proper relation and proportion between the 
operations of inquiry
In the Logic, Dewey distinguishes between observation, fact gathering, perception, 
conception, reasoning, and ideas as different operations that exercise different 
functions in inquiry. He does not, however, describe exactly what the ideal relation 
should be between these operations beyond the claim that they need to mutually affect 
each other in the process. However, it is clear from the following passage that he holds 
that many defects in thinking are the consequence of one of the operations exercising 
too much control over another. Dewey’s solution is also clear: let sensitivity to the 
qualitative situation as a whole regulate how much, for example, observation and 
conceptual ordering should relate to one another.
It is more or less a commonplace that it is possible to carry on observations that 
amass facts tirelessly and yet the observed “facts” lead nowhere. On the other hand, it 
46. “Such intellectual deiniteness and coherence as the objects and criticisms of esthetic and 
moral subjects possess is due to their being controlled by the quality of subject-matter as a whole. 
Consideration of the meaning of regulation by an underlying and pervasive quality is the theme of this 
article” (LW 5: 246).
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is possible to have the work of observation so controlled by a conceptual framework 
ixed in advance that the very things which are genuinely decisive in the problem 
in hand and its solution, are completely overlooked. Everything is forced into the 
predetermined conceptual and theoretical scheme. The way, and the only way, to 
escape these two evils, is sensitivity to the quality of a situation as a whole. In ordinary 
language, a problem must be felt before it can be stated. If the unique quality of the 
situation is had immediately, then there is something that regulates the selection and 
the weighing of observed facts and their conceptual ordering (LW 12: 76).
viii. The qualitative as the control-guidance provided by phases of 
undergoing and synthesis of all experimental inquiries
The above functions of the qualitative need to be understood as integral to a larger 
and complex process. In any process of inquiry we can make a functional distinction 
between phases of doing and undergoing as well as phases of analysis and synthesis47. 
These phases are mutually dependent and are what make inquiry a cumulative 
undertaking that can guide itself to some inal judgment. The qualitative is responsible 
for the undergoing and synthesis phases that regulate the doing and analysis. Analysis 
is what we do when inquiry is centered on making some iner discrimination of the 
parts that make up our problematic situation. Synthesis takes place when we are 
concerned with weighing how the parts contribute to the making of overall judgments. 
 The inal judgment in any inquiry is a synthesis that results from the analysis 
of the situation as a whole, but it is only the inal step in a series of tentative overall 
judgments that have occurred throughout the entire process of deliberation. This same 
process can also be described in terms of the phases of the doing and undergoing of 
any mundane experimental learning process. The doing might be acting to gather 
more evidence or the active operations of recollection and exploration. Undergoing 
occurs in the form of a constant receptivity to what is revealed by our doings (e.g., 
testing a hypothesis) or the reactions of others engaged in the process. 
ix. The qualitative guides judgment: Dewey’s contextualism
In philosophy, because of the linguistic turn, judgments are often treated as 
or simply equated with propositions or as an aspect of discourse But for Dewey a 
judgment is not a proposition48, a judgment is a practical act, afirmation, or assertion 
that “in distinction from propositions which are singular, plural, generic and universal, 
is individual, since it is concerned with unique qualitative situations” (LW 12: 283; 
emphasis mine). Dewey was a contextualist in regard to judgment. His contextualism 
is radical since what ultimately guides and warrants our judgments are not the shared 
standards of a community nor the most stable inherited norms, however useful and 
binding these resources may be, but the individual unique qualitative situation that we 
are in. In his contextualism the control and guidance provided in inquiry by context 
is provided in part by the underlying and pervasive quality of the situation that is 
47. These are distinctions that Dewey made about inquiry in his more educational texts, such as “How 
We Think” (MW 6). 
48. For more on this important tenet of Dewey, see Burke 1994. 
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being transformed. To be sure, propositions in inquiry are tested by their coherence 
with other propositions as well as the result of operations with inquiry (observation, 
reasoning, and so on) but applicability of the inal judgment to the problematic 
situation is the ultimate test of its validity. 
In inquiry the agent is engaged in a process of continually shaping and reshaping 
(doing and undergoing) until she qualitatively appreciates that the proposed solution 
meets the demands or problems presented by the developing situation that has 
been explored. When this happens a judgment is warranted, but this is experienced 
as an immediate quality of determinacy that can be described as a ittingness or 
appropriateness to the situation. In other words, the inal judgment is the qualitative 
appreciation and assertion that, in light of the terrain explored, this is the solution that 
is called for by the situation, and not a deduction from propositions or from a universal 
criterion. To acquire the habits capable of making these kinds of context-sensitive 
judgments is to have intelligence. Notice what this entails. The qualitative instructions 
that tell whether one has come close to fulillment in inquiry are not to be found 
outside of the particular unique qualitative situation that is experienced as needing 
transformation. “The making comes to an end when its result is experienced as good – 
and that experience comes not by mere intellectual and outside judgment but in direct 
perception” (LW 10: 56). The situation itself can give the agent a pervading qualitative 
sense of relevance and satisfactory closure during the process of reconstruction.
The above contextualism is assumed in Dewey’s Logic. Without it one misses an 
important restraint, control, or guidance that he takes for granted in his presentation 
of the structure and operations of inquiry. Without it his view of inquiry seems 
vulnerable to the charge that his view is not robust enough to account for how, 
without presupposing some universal criteria or standard of truth, inquiry can arrive 
at justiied belief. Critics of Dewey cannot understand how his empirical approach 
to inquiry, one that denies the absolute and a priori character of logical forms, could 
have enough normative force or constraints to avoid laxity or relativism in matters of 
inquiry. The following reply of Dewey applies to many of his critics: “The source of 
Russell’s misconception of my view is his imperviousness to what I have said about 
the problematic quality of situations as giving both the occasion for and the control of 
inquiry” (LW 14: 33, emphasis mine).
Appreciating the function of the qualitative in Dewey is important for appreciating 
how he reverses the order of where normative-regulative force comes from. Philosophy 
has been very top down on this issue. It is common to assume that the normativity 
or reasonableness of particular judgments is solely derivative from general rules. For 
Dewey, this is backwards and puts the emphasis on the wrong place. Judgments are 
individual acts and are concerned with a unique qualitative context. Rules, criteria, 
standards, and reasons are instrumentalities that ultimately derive their validity from 
particular judgments, even though after many successful inquiries, and because of 
their success, they acquire their own normative force. As was previously said, the 
wiser among us rely on these instrumentalities only when one’s habitual response 
to situations is not suficient, or after a judgment in order to justify oneself or invite 
others to consider the situation for themselves.
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V. Conclusion 
 I have outlined nine functions of the qualitative in inquiry in order to show the 
difference that experience has made to Pragmatism in the study of human thought and 
inquiry. For ECP it was experience as a methodological commitment (in its critical, 
preventative, and edifying functions) that enabled Dewey to criticize the modern view 
of knowledge and thinking as a capacity of reason. It was experience that enabled 
him to avoid the dualisms, reductionism, and intellectualism that are so common and 
tempting in epistemology-logic. More importantly, it was because of experience that 
he was able to provide such a rich view of inquiry. He foresaw what recent scientiic 
accounts of human thinking have conirmed: it is more bodily based, non-linguistic, 
complex, messy, and less linear than philosophers have assumed. 
As a reaction to the modern notion of reason, many twentieth century philosophers 
(including LCP) has stressed the historical, social, and linguistic aspects of thinking, 
but often at the expense of the role of the qualitative in thinking. While the qualitative 
is not all there is to thinking, it seems to be part of what would be questioned or given 
up if we followed the advice of LCP and eliminated experience. 
None of this will likely convince LCP nor refute his/her approach to Pragmatism,
but it makes clear what, from the point of view of ECP, is at stake in eliminating 
experience. It also serves to highlight how signiicant are the differences between 
these two types of pragmatists. It will not facilitate future dialogue if LCP continue 
to misdirect their criticism of experience to the traditional modern notion and also 
neglect the particular metaphilosophical functions of experience that I have outlined 
at the beginning of this paper. To be sure, LCP may disagree about these functions or 
suggest that experience is not the best means to accomplish them in philosophy, but 
this would be an improvement over the present lack of confrontation of our deeper 
differences.
Dewey, of course, recognized the linguistic context of inquiry but this is simply 
not all there is to context49, contrary to LCP we are not just embedded in “linguistic 
practices”50. For Dewey, the idea that I am in a situation that is had in some pre-
cognitive way strikes him as more concrete and obvious than saying that I am in a 
“practice” as a “language game” (or anything linguistic), which seems more of an 
abstraction or a description of everyday life from a theoretical point of view. Nothing 
could be more contrary to the metaphilosophical commitment to experience than for 
philosophy to start with a theoretical view of things. If LCP starts with the theory 
that all lived experience or practice, including our inquiries, are discursive all the 
way down, then from the point of view of ECP this is as problematic as the dualistic 
starting points of modern philosophy. For ECP the recognition that there is a qualitative 
aspect of context that is non-linguistic (and even ineffable) does not commit them to 
the existence of a mysterious domain or a problematic epistemic given. It is just to 
49. Dewey would argue that to think that language is all there is to context is to commit the philosophical 
fallacy. We can discriminate the perhaps unavoidable and important linguistic component of our lived 
situations, but to then proclaim that it is all language is fallacious.
50. Brandom (2011: 26).
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acknowledge the embodied and “felt” character of all of our activities, including the 
most abstract thinking. And as I have argued, the sciences continue to conirm that the 
context that guides inquiry is embodied and “felt” and not linguistic.
LCP could reply that they are not denying that there is a nonlinguistic aspect 
to life, but simply that it is not that important. But this is precisely what the above 
functions of the qualitative refute. The function of the qualitative is not, as traditionally 
thought, limited to what causes or motives (“sparks” or “triggers”) inquiry. For ECP 
what surrounds the linguistic and cognitive is not tangential to what is discursive, it 
plays several guiding roles in all of the operations and phases of inquiry. Inquiry is, 
of course, social and linguistic, but without the above functions of the qualitative 
the pragmatist account of inquiry seems to lack not only friction or constraints, as 
suggested by Bernstein, but a robust enough view about the regulation of inquiry. 
ECP also inds it dificult to give up on experience because the alternative approach 
of LCP has so far left the pragmatists view of inquiry vulnerable to some problems. 
These are the consequences of LCP (and their elimination of experience) that concerned 
Bernstein. I share this concern and have extend and strengthen Bernstein’s argument 
about why the classical pragmatists valorize experience in relation to inquiry and why 
we must continue to do so. 
Bernstein is correct to point out that for the classical pragmatists experience 
meant brute compulsiveness (what Peirce calls “secondness”), but just as important 
is its qualitative character (what Peirce calls “irstness”). Acknowledgement of the 
qualitative aspect in any inquiry is required to make sense of how inquiry can regulate 
itself without the need of foundations outside of experience, but also without sliding 
into the linguistic relativism of LCP. The danger of the LCP view of inquiry is that 
there seems to be nothing that regulates language except more language. 
While secondness accounts for the “brute constraint” of our inquiries, or the idea 
that there is a natural-environmental “grain of things” that humans need to respect, 
the qualitative accounts for how inquires are able to guide themselves in the process 
of inquiry. This is not a small addition to Bernstein’s line of argumentation. It is 
one thing is to claim that everyday situational experience does not let us think what 
we want, and another that it can guide us if we are ready to listen. The secondness 
accounts for why we need to be open and fallible, since experience can surprise us, 
but the qualitative accounts for why we need to be sensitive to our doings in inquiry. 
If with secondness experience “says NO”51 and shows the limitations of language, 
with the qualitative experience says “YES and NO” insofar as it is a key force in 
guiding concrete inquirers in their transformation of an indeterminate situation to 
one that is determinate. The nine functions of the qualitative outlined in the previous 
section means that for Dewey without the qualitative we cannot account for the unity, 
continuity, coherence, direction, and self-regulation of our best inquiries. 
Dewey’s ultimate grounding is a historical and contextual one, but the appeal to 
context is not just to discourse, community standards, or consensus. These things are 
important but they are part of a situation. If a problem has a solution it must emerge 
51. Bernstein (2010: 134).
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from guiding our inquiry by its initial direct and unique problematic character. It is 
not true that without some external criteria of truth or validity we are lost and cannot 
transform the situation. Dewey appeals to a faith in our transactions within nature, 
that is, within a situation that can guide our judgments. The context is a qualitative 
situation; its guiding does not entail foundationalism and it makes the nonlinguistic 
important in ways denied by LCP. 
I have not, of course, in this paper challenged LCP on their own ground, though 
I have presented to him/her a challenge based on what I take to be a common ground: 
if you are a pragmatists, then show us the difference that preferring language over 
experience makes in doing philosophy, and in particular in the notion of inquiry. 
LCP is not devoid of providing some reasonable replies to the challenges or 
questions I have presented. Lets consider even if briely some possible replies they 
could make on behalf of eliminating experience and adopting a linguistic approach. 
I have argued that the account of inquiry inherited by the classical igures (one that 
is tied to their notion of experience) is worth reconstructing because it makes sense of 
our own experience of some common features of our best inquiries (e.g., its immediate 
experiential constraining and guiding quality) and it is receiving much support from 
recent research on the science of cognition. However, LCP can always reply that they 
can also muster empirical evidence for their view or that they are simply not interested 
in being empirical, at least in the same sense that the classical igures were. 
LCP could also argue that they can achieve the exact same fruits, a rich and 
empirical notion of inquiry, without invoking experience and without the need to 
abandon their linguistic center view of thinking. Someone like Brandom, for instance, 
may ind ingenious way to accommodate for the qualitative (and its functions) in his 
view by distinguishing between his preferred assertoric uses of language and more 
emotional or expressive uses, but to this day he doesn’t have a fully developed view 
about the role of emotions in inquiry or in guiding practical dealings with one another. 
In any case, it is not clear how starting from his theoretical picture of practice as 
discursive can Brandom account for the embodied nature of human cognition and 
activities. As Steven Levine has argued, Brandom’s Pragmatism “remains immanent 
to the realm of the discursive. But this makes it impossible for him to understand 
a richer sense of practice that is often at work in the classical pragmatists, namely, 
the bodily practices, habits, and skills through which subjects inhabit and cope with 
the environment, physical and social. For many pragmatists, the body is not a just 
an instrument that carries out orders that have their origin in the discursive realm, 
rather for them a subject’s sensori-motor engagements with a physical and social 
environment already have sense before the operations of discursive reason get into 
the act. This type of bodily engagement is our basic way of ‘being-in-the-world’, and 
our representational dealings with things emerge from this background”52. 
We should not however underestimate LCP. One recourse open to them, and their 
most likely reply, is to argue that they can incorporate all of the functions that ECP 
(following Dewey) attribute to the “qualitative” (including its regulative function) by 
52. Levine (2012: 126).
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means of a sophisticated theoretical account of how what may seem non-linguistic can 
be reduced or transformed to linguistic skills or entities. For example, Brandom may 
give some role to emotions and feelings in discursive practices, but only after they are 
conceived as psychological phenomena that are relevant only insofar as they can be 
explained entirely in terms of inferential moves in the space of reasons; or perhaps it 
can be shown that what is qualitative or emotional is somehow constituted by beliefs 
or a discursive norm53. Another possible reply by LCP is to acknowledge functions 
of a qualitative dimension of life but only as psychological phenomena or forces that 
are causes but not reasons in inquiry. As Mark A. Wrathall and others have argued, 
the lingua-centric neo-pragmatists are committed to a strict dichotomy of reasons and 
causes. So whatever cannot be discursively redeemed goes on the brute-causation 
side of the dichotomy54. These possible replies would strike ECP as reductionistic 
(in so far as the qualitative is theoretically reduced to what is linguistic) and seems to 
presuppose a problematic dualism between causes and reasons. According to Steven 
Levine the distinctions found in Brandom “between norm and cause, mind (the space of 
reasons) and body (reliable response dispositions) are precisely the ones that classical 
pragmatists would criticize”, but “Brandom, in contrast, is simply not interested in 
undoing the dualisms and dichotomies passed on by the classical tradition. In this 
respect, Brandom rejects an essential element of the pragmatic enlightenment”55. 
Reductionism and dualisms are among the problems that ECP think can be prevented 
by adopting experience as a methodological commitment. 
Perhaps the most dificult challenge for LCP is to continue to develop their view 
without avoiding the implication that there is nothing that guides inquiry except 
language. To be sure they have a much richer and more “praxis” oriented view of 
discourse than the traditional analytic philosophers, but ultimately what guides 
discourse is just more discourse. This is what has made their version of Pragmatism 
liable to the charge that their resulting linguistic view of inquiry leaves no traction 
or friction with its context and to understand how inquiry can guide itself and avoid 
a linguistic idealism56. It is not obvious how even the sort of practical mastery of 
53. In a recent interview Brandom was asked what was the importance of emotions in discursive 
practices. He replies, “I think they can come in in two ways. First of all, there is the Kantian principle 
that ‘ought implies can’ which has led people thinking about ethics and ethical normative evaluations 
of individual actions to be properly concerned with moral psychology, for instance, with the way in 
which psychological issues affect what people can do, what situations they can become sensitive to. 
And I think that there may well be an analogous set of considerations in the political case where we 
are not talking so much about the actions of individuals as we are about the way in which normative 
statuses and normative attitudes of people occupying different roles within an institution change. The 
second way in which emotional or, more broadly, psychological issues can matter in the political 
context of course has to do with our aim. It may well be that the aims of many of the participants in a 
political process concern the emotional well-being or status, the psychological status, of various people 
who are affected by the outcome of that political process, in which case psychology is going to matter 
in politics”. [www.pitt.edu/~brandom/downloads/Brandom Interview Pritzlaff 2008%5B1%5D.pdf]
54. On how the distinction between reasons and causes (found in Quine, Davidson, Rorty, McDowell, 
and Brandom) and how it can be questioned see Wrathall 2004; Kukla, and Lance 2014; Sachs 2012.
55.  Levine (2012: 127).
56. In “The Demand for Transcendental Friction: Avoiding Idealism”, in C.  I.  Lewis, Sellars, and 
McDowell” (paper read at 2014 Eastern APA) Carl B. Sachs argues that a central theme in C. I. Lewis, 
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“norms implicit in linguistic practice” found in the normative theory of Brandom 
can avoid the charge or danger of sliding into a form of Pragmatism that is close to a 
language-communal relativism. 
The debate between LCP and ECP will continue. I am hopeful that the clariications 
and provocations provided in this paper will contribute to having a more genuine and 
fruitful debate among pragmatists. LCP should show the fruits of its linguistic starting 
point, as I have shown the fruits of experience, so that at least the undecided can 
determine whether Pragmatism is better of going with “experience” or “language”. 
For ECP we must not abandon experience but work with the insights about experience 
inherited from James and Dewey so that we can continue to develop our rich account 
of inquiry. This is how we must chart Pragmatism’s course for the twentieth century. 
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